

Calendar No. 165
Calendar No. 166

82D CONGRESS }
1st Session }

SENATE

{REPORT
{No. 175

ASSIGNMENT OF GROUND FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES TO DUTY
IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ON
S. Res. 99 and S. Con. Res. 18



MARCH 14 (legislative day, MARCH 12), 1951.—Ordered to be
printed with illustrations

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1951

80986

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
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA

1 March 1951



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No. 175 }

ASSIGNMENT OF GROUND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES TO DUTY IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

MARCH 14 (legislative day, MARCH 12), 1951.—Ordered to be printed with illustrations

Mr. CONNALLY and Mr. RUSSELL, from the Committees on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services, jointly submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. Res. 99 and S. Con. Res. 18]

The joint committee made up of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, having had under consideration Senate Resolution 8, Eighty-second Congress, first session, which declares it to be the sense of the Senate that no United States ground forces should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty, pending the adoption of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress, reports two resolutions of its own (S. Res. 99 and S. Con. Res. 18) for the consideration of the Senate.

The report that follows is directed to Senate Resolution 99. However, inasmuch as the language of the two resolutions is identical, the report applies equally to Senate Concurrent Resolution 18.

PART I. BACKGROUND

1. PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The resolution endorses the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and approves the present plans of the administration to send four additional divisions of United States ground troops to Europe as our contribution to the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area. It expresses the sense of the Senate that congressional approval should be obtained of any policy which may in the future require the assignment of American troops abroad under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It also requires

certification by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that certain conditions specified in the resolution have been met before such troops will be sent.

2. TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION

The text of the two resolutions is identical except that where the Senate resolution refers to the Senate, the concurrent resolution refers to the Congress. The text of the Senate resolution is reproduced below.

[S. Res. 99]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the foreign policy and military strength of the United States are dedicated to the protection of our national security, the preservation of the liberties of the American people, and the maintenance of world peace; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty, approved by the Senate by a vote of 82-13, is a major and historic act designed to build up the collective strength of the free peoples of the earth to resist aggression, and to preserve world peace; and

Whereas the security of the United States and its citizens is involved with the security of its partners under the North Atlantic Treaty, and the commitments of that treaty are therefore an essential part of the foreign policy of the United States; and

Whereas article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledges that the United States and the other parties thereto "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"; and

Whereas recent events have threatened world peace and as a result all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are individually and collectively mobilizing their productive capacities and manpower for their self-defense; and

Whereas the free nations of Europe are vital centers of civilization, freedom, and production, and their subjugation by totalitarian forces would weaken and endanger the defensive capacity of the United States and the other free nations; and

Whereas the success of our common defense effort under a unified command requires the vigorous action and the full cooperation of all treaty partners in the supplying of materials and men on a fair and equitable basis, and General Eisenhower has testified that the "bulk" of the land forces should be supplied by our European allies and that such numbers supplied should be the "major fraction" of the total number: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That—

1. the Senate approves the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. it is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty should consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

4. it is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned;

5. the Senate herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received;

6. it is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe;

7. it is the sense of the Senate that the President should submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than six months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be made available for this purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

3. THE SETTING

When the Senate in 1949 gave its approval to the North Atlantic Treaty by a vote of 82 to 13, it was hoped the undertaking in article 5 that an armed attack against one party "should be considered an attack against them all" and the undertaking in article 3 to achieve the objectives of the treaty by "effective self-help and mutual aid" would be enough to deter possible Soviet aggression. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act, also passed in 1949, was enacted in the belief that our security required the building up of the defensive strength of the Western European pact countries and that the most effective contribution the United States could make would be the supplying of arms.

During the past year the fall of China, the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea, Soviet intransigence in the face of United Nations action to defend Korea, the threats directed toward Yugoslavia by the Soviet and her satellites, and the establishment on the borders of Western Europe of Communist armies of overwhelming size and with equipment in some respects superior to that of the defenders of Western Europe, have indicated the threat of Soviet attack requires vigorous action if security for the free world is to be obtained.

The Congress, when it passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, provided that a substantial part of the funds to be appropriated were not to be spent until the President "approves recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area * * *." The conference report on that bill made it clear that this meant the establishment of "unity of purpose, unity of defense planning, unity of direction, and unity of execution * * *."

As a part of the North Atlantic defense program, the North Atlantic Treaty countries agreed at the Brussels Conference in December 1950, that they would create a united, unified, integrated army to provide the necessary defense for Western Europe. They planned to build that army over the next 2 years. They agreed to set up a Supreme Commander and unanimously asked President Truman to designate

General Eisenhower to that post. President Truman announced the appointment on December 19.

Partly as the result of an announcement by President Truman on September 9, 1950, that, on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had authorized "substantial increases in the strength of the United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe," increasing concern was expressed in the United States as to the nature and scope of American contributions to the defense of the free world in Western Europe.

When the Eighty-second Congress met in January 1951, a debate on the foreign policy of the United States was immediately touched off. During this debate doubt was expressed of the ability of the Western European peoples to defend themselves and the capacity of the United States to produce sufficient arms or men to help effectively defend Western Europe. On January 8, Senator Wherry of Nebraska introduced a resolution (S. Res. 8), subsequently modified on January 16, which was referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, jointly, on January 23. The resolution provided in part that—

no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending the adoption of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress.

4. GENERAL EISENHOWER'S REPORT

Although the Wherry resolution had been referred to the joint committee prior to the return of General Eisenhower from his survey of the defense efforts of the North Atlantic countries, it was agreed that hearings would not be opened until the Congress had heard his report.

General Eisenhower, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, left Washington on January 6, 1951. In his 3 week's tour he stopped in the capitals of all our Atlantic Treaty partners, namely, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg, Iceland, and Canada. He spoke to the chiefs of state, the premiers, the prime ministers, the defense ministers, and top military officials, and, in addition, to the American Ambassadors and Ministers. On January 27, he returned to the United States, and, after making his report to the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, he addressed a joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives on February 1, 1951.

That address underlined the importance of the defense of Western Europe to the United States, not merely from a military point of view but also from the point of view of skilled manpower, of cultural ties, and of raw materials sources. It emphasized the need for cooperation and stressed that our partners must contribute fully to the common defense. On his trip, asserted General Eisenhower, he noted among our allies evidence of a—

rejuvenation, a growth of determination, a spirit to resist * * *

The most important thing that the United States could contribute in his opinion was leadership and morale.

* * * faith in America * * * lies at the bottom of this whole thing. Faith that the leadership she can provide will inspire the same kind of feeling, the same kind of effort in our friends abroad * * *.

5. COMMITTEE ACTION

The joint committee held its first meeting on the afternoon of February 1, 1951, to hear General Eisenhower in executive session supplement his statement made before the informal joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

On February 15, the committee began 2 weeks of public hearings, during which 6 administration witnesses and 33 non-Government witnesses were heard. Presenting the administration's case for sending additional troops to Europe in implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty were: Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense; Hon. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State; Gen. Omar N. Bradley (Chairman), Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

A number of witnesses were heard at the request of the sponsor of Senate Resolution 8. Among them were: Gen. Harold George, United States Air Force, retired; Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commanding general, Strategic Air Command; Maj. Alexander de Seversky; Gen. Carl Spaatz, United States Air Force, retired; and Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, commanding general, Air Defense Command, United States Air Force. The committee also heard the testimony of the following Members of Congress: Senator Robert A. Taft, of Ohio; Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, of Nebraska; Representative W. J. Bryan Dorn, of South Carolina; Representative John F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts; former Senator Albert W. Hawkes, of New Jersey; and former Senator John Sherman Cooper, of Kentucky. Other witnesses included former President Herbert Hoover; Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, of New York; Hon. Harold E. Stassen, president of the University of Pennsylvania; and Gen. Lucius D. Clay, special assistant to the Director of Defense Mobilization. A number of other witnesses were heard, who represented various organizations. The public hearings were concluded on February 28, 1951.

The committee held seven executive sessions to hear further testimony of the Defense Department and to mark up the draft resolution proposed by Senator Connally and Senator Russell as a substitute for Senate Resolution 8 and to consider a number of other related proposals. On March 1, the joint committee met to discuss procedure. On March 2, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Gen. Omar N. Bradley, and Rear Adm. M. E. Curts, Chief of Undersea Warfare Section, Office of Naval Operations, were heard. Hon. W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense, accompanied by Admiral H. A. Houser, Director, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Gen. W. B. Persons, Washington representative, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe; and Lyle S. Garlock, Director, Office of Budget, Department of Defense, was heard on March 3 on the defense budget. The executive sessions of March 6, 7, and 8 were devoted to a section-by-section analysis of the draft resolution and the adoption of amendments. On March 8, the committee voted 23 to 0 to report Senate Resolution 99 to the Senate. At the same time, the committee voted 16 to 8 to report the same resolution in the form of a concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 18) in order to permit House participation. There being several unresolved questions as to the meaning of parts of the resolutions, the committee met on March 13 and agreed upon the language embodied in the resolutions reported to the Senate.

PART II. ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTION

6. ANALYSIS OF RESOLUTION

Preamble

The seven clauses of the preamble set forth the reasons for the resolution and the background against which it was drafted. The clauses state that American foreign policy and military strength are designed to protect national security, preserve American liberties, and maintain world peace. It is noted that world security is threatened and that the subjugation of the free people of Europe would endanger our defensive capacity. Accordingly, it is important to all the North Atlantic Treaty partners that each should carry out its obligation of developing its collective and individual capacities to resist armed attack; in the interests of common defense, each partner should contribute its share of men and materials on a fair and equitable basis. All parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are now collectively mobilizing their productive capacities and manpower for self-defense, and General Eisenhower has testified that our European partners will supply the "bulk" of the land forces.

Paragraph 1—Approval of Eisenhower appointment

The first operative paragraph of the resolution—

approves the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing armed forces of the United States in Europe under his command.

The committee notes the following passage in the President's appointing letter to General Eisenhower.

* * * I have designated you as Supreme Commander, Europe. * * *

You are hereby assigned operational command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission, of the United States Army Forces, Europe; United States Air Forces, Europe; and the United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

The President's action took place on December 19, 1950, the day on which the North Atlantic Council completed plans for an integrated defense force under a unified, centralized command and invited the President to appoint General Eisenhower. The committee considers the choice a wise and a popular one, which should speed the accomplishment of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. It, therefore, recommends unanimously that the Senate express its endorsement of the action of the President in appointing General Eisenhower to this important post.

Paragraph 2—Stationing United States armed forces in Western Europe

Paragraph 2 expresses the belief of the Senate that the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners is so threatened that the United States finds it necessary as its contribution to the joint defense efforts, to station abroad units of American armed forces necessary to constitute our fair share of the joint defense forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

In considering the number of American troops to be stationed abroad under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the committee considered the advisability of fixing a ratio between the number of American troops to be sent to Europe and the number of ground forces to be supplied by our partners. The committee felt it undesirable to

fix such a ratio and instead sought to indicate the number of American troops to be stationed abroad by use of the phrase "fair share."

Interpretation of the phrase "fair share" involves an estimate of what the other partners are doing as their fair share in building joint defenses. Since the committee in paragraph 6 approves the dispatch of four additional divisions to Western Europe, thus contemplating United States forces in Western Europe totaling approximately six divisions, this figure is apparently accepted as our fair contribution at this time in the light of our allies' efforts. In this connection it should be noted that paragraph 5 indicates that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The reference in this paragraph to "units of our Armed Forces," is a reference not only to ground troops, but also to other units of our military forces which may be stationed abroad from time to time as an American contribution to the joint defense of the North Atlantic area.

Paragraph 3—Consultation

This paragraph expresses the sense of the Senate that before the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, sends ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, he should consult the congressional committees primarily concerned with the formulation of foreign and military policies. The joint committee believes that, in such important matters which involve the security of the United States and world peace, the Congress should be kept informed of developments and should be in a position to participate in the formulation of major policy steps. In this way the unity of purpose and action on the part of the Executive and the Congress so necessary to public understanding and the full cooperation of the American people will be assured. In order to bring about complete coordination, the resolution also provides that the President should consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense.

Two points should be emphasized in connection with the consultation procedure provided for in paragraph 3. In the first place, the use of the word "before" makes it perfectly clear that consultation should take place *before* and not *after* ground forces are assigned to Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty. In the second place, in view of the express terms of paragraph 6, the consultation recommended in paragraph 3 does not apply to the four divisions of ground forces which are to be sent to Western Europe in accordance with the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Paragraphs 4-5—Certification by Joint Chiefs of Staff

Paragraph 4 expresses the sense of the Senate that, in advance of sending additional ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify that the parties to the treaty are doing their part under that article, especially with respect to the creation of combat units.

It is important to make sure that our partners are contributing their fair share toward the common defense. It is especially important in building the new integrated defense force under General Eisenhower that full cooperation shall be given by those associated with us in the venture. This is particularly true of the creation of combat units. In order to assure the American people and the Congress that

these purposes are being served, certification of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that effect is required.

Paragraph 5 incorporates two principal points: The first is that it makes clear the sentiment of the Senate that the major portion of the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command shall be furnished by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty. The second is that prior to the assignment of such United States ground troops for service abroad, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States.

Paragraph 5 also sets up the procedure whereby the certification is to be carried out. It will be noted that in both cases the certified opinions referred to are to be transmitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

Paragraph 6—Congressional approval

Paragraph 6 puts the Senate on record with respect to two important matters: In the first place, it states that congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the sending of troops abroad under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The committee believes that such approval will promote national unity and understanding and will be in accord with sound constitutional processes.

In the second place, it approves the present plans of the administration to send four additional divisions of American troops to bolster the joint defense of Western Europe. There was no divergence of views within the joint committee on this point. The committee wishes to underline the importance of this unanimous decision on one of the most significant policy issues which has confronted our country since the end of World War II. It believes that such unity, which reflects the support of the American people, will be extremely helpful in developing the morale of our European partners and in building the collective strength of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

Paragraph 6 is limited in scope. It refers only to ground troops sent abroad for the purpose of implementing article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It does not call for congressional approval to send naval or air forces abroad. It does not apply to American troops in occupied areas or to armed forces sent to Europe under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nor is it concerned with armed forces which the President might send abroad under his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

The term "congressional approval" as used in paragraph 6 is subject to different interpretations. On the one hand, some members of the joint committee expressed the view that congressional approval could only be given by formal legislation. Others believed that both the letter and the spirit of paragraph 6 might be met, in certain circumstances, as the result of consultation by the administration with, and the approval of, the appropriate committees of the Congress. In any event, it should be noted that the resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that congressional approval should be given; it is not a legislative mandate.

Paragraph 7—Reports to Congress

This paragraph calls upon the President to submit reports to the Congress periodically on how the North Atlantic Treaty is being implemented. It also calls upon him to include such information as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, may make available. Similar

provisions are to be found in many of the recent acts of Congress dealing with foreign relations of the United States, notably the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and the Economic Cooperation Act.

PART III. PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

7. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES OF NATO COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET BLOC

In analyzing the present world situation, the joint committee gave considerable attention to the relative strength, both economic and military, of the North Atlantic Treaty countries and the Soviet bloc. While the ability of a nation to defend itself depends in part on such intangible factors as morale and will to fight, the figures in the table below give some indication of the actual and potential importance of Western Europe in building the defensive strength of the free world.

Armed forces

As of December 1950 about 2,600,000 men were under arms in the ground forces of the United States and the North Atlantic countries, while total armed forces were about 4,500,000. In addition, about 2,700,000 individuals were in the organized reserves making a grand total of organized armed strength well over 7,000,000. The following table gives the situation as of December 1950. Particular attention should be given to the number per thousand of population in the armed services.

Estimated armed forces of NATO countries (December 1950)

Country	Ground forces	Navy and air	Total	Population	Number per thousand of population in service	Organized reserves	Total organized strength	Number per thousand of population
	Thousands	Thousands	Thousands	Millions		Thousands		
Belgium.....	91	11	102	8.6	12	-----	102	12
Luxembourg.....	2	-----	2	.3	5	-----	2	5
Denmark.....	23	6	29	4.2	7	115	144	34
France.....	600	122	722	41.6	17	1,500	2,222	53
Italy.....	245	62	307	46.2	7	-----	307	7
Netherlands.....	78	36	114	10.0	11	30	144	14
Norway.....	15	10	25	3.2	8	65	90	28
Portugal.....	64	9	73	8.6	8	200	273	32
United Kingdom.....	380	349	729	50.5	14	147	876	17
Subtotal (European NATO).....	1,498	605	2,103	173.2	12	2,057	4,160	24
Canada.....	34	27	61	13.8	4	31	92	7
United States.....	1,100	1,200	2,300	151.8	15	636	2,936	19
Grand total.....	2,632	1,832	4,464	338.8	-----	2,724	7,188	-----

Exact figures are not available for the number of men under arms in the Soviet Union; but the total armed strength of its military forces is estimated at 4,000,000 organized into 175 divisions, spread over Eastern Europe, Siberia, and the Far East. A relatively large number of armored divisions are in areas adjacent to Western Europe. The Soviet satellites in Europe have an additional 1,000,000 men under arms. There are no reliable estimates available for inclusion in this table of the number of reserves in Soviet Russia and her satellites. The available estimates of forces in being may be set forth as follows:

Estimated present armed forces and population of Eastern European countries

Country	Armed forces	Population	Number per thousand of population in service
	<i>Thousands</i>	<i>Millions</i>	
Soviet Union.....	4,000	203.0	20
Soviet satellites:			
Albania.....	50	1.2	42
Bulgaria.....	190	7.2	26
Czechoslovakia.....	140	12.5	11
East Germany.....	50	19.5	3
Hungary.....	60	9.2	7
Poland.....	200	24.5	8
Rumania.....	275	16.0	17
Total.....	4,965	293.1	

These figures should be used with caution. For example, on the one hand they make no allowance for the vast area the Soviet forces must defend; nor, on the other hand, do they take into account the fact that the Soviet forces have been for a long time under a single unified command and as a result can be moved from place to place with greater ease than can many of the NATO forces which, until they are successfully integrated, are still tied down to the defense of a single country. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the combined population of the North Atlantic countries exceeds that of the Soviet bloc, and the number of men in the organized military forces excluding reserves is approximately equal. Again such a conclusion must be used guardedly since it makes no allowance for the tremendous distance involved in the transportation of troops and supplies from the United States to Western Europe.

It will be noted also that the table includes only Soviet and North Atlantic Treaty countries. It thus omits certain non-Soviet states, such as Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Yugoslavia, whose reserves of manpower are important equations in the total picture. China and other far eastern countries likewise are not included.

Economic and financial capabilities

As far as financial and economic capabilities are concerned the combined figures for the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe are far greater than those for the Soviet Union and her satellite states. The situation is set forth in tabular form below. Again it is important to bear in mind that figures available for the Soviet Union are often unreliable. However, the table is close enough to actualities to demonstrate how important a free Western Europe is to United States security. If Western Europe were to fall under Soviet domination, the Soviet economic and productive strength in some respects would equal, if not exceed, that of the United States. Moreover, under such circumstances it would be extremely difficult for us to secure certain strategic materials of great importance to the American economy. Opinions differ on whether or not the United States could maintain its independence isolated from the rest of the world with vast pools of skilled workers and the economic resources of Western Europe in the hands of the Soviet Union. It is the considered judgment of our military leaders that the loss of that area would be, at the very least, a disaster of serious consequences to us and to our chances for survival as a free nation.

Estimated comparative east-west capabilities for 1950

Category	Unit	Total east	Of which—			Total west	Of which—					
			U.S.S.R.	European satellites ¹	Communist China		United States	Canada	Rest of Western Hemisphere	Middle and Near East	United Kingdom	Continental Western Europe ²
Gross national income ³	Billions of dollars.	112.0	70.0	25.0	17.0	434.0	281.0	16.0	(4)	(4)	39.0	97.0
Military expenditures ⁶	do.	13.0	11.0	1.5	.5	24.6	16.9	.6	(4)	(4)	2.3	4.8
Military expenditures as percent of GNI	do.	12.0	16.0	6.0	3.0	5.5	6.0	3.5	(4)	(4)	6.0	5.0
Civilian employment	Millions of persons.	390.0	95.0	45.0	250.0	194.0	60.0	5.0	(4)	(4)	23.0	106.0
Of which—												
Nonagricultural labor force	do.	126.0	⁶ 45.0	21.0	60.0	140.0	52.5	4.0	(4)	(4)	21.5	62.0
Agricultural labor force	do.	263.0	50.0	23.0	190.0	54.0	7.5	1.0	(4)	(4)	1.5	44.0
Production of—												
Crude steel	Million metric tons.	33.0	25.5	7.0	.5	142.3	87.7	3.4	(4)	(4)	16.6	34.6
Crude oil ⁷	do.	46.0	38.0	8.0	(8)	459.1	266.2	3.6	⁹ 99.4	¹⁰ 87.6	None	2.3
Primary aluminum	Thousand metric tons.	192.5	180.0	12.5	None	1,266.5	652.1	363.0	(4)	(4)	30.0	221.4
Metal-cutting machine tools ¹¹	Thousand units.	113.5	80.0	30.0	3.5	(12)	140.0	(12)	(4)	(4)	(12)	(12)
Machine-tool inventory ¹¹	do.	1,825.0	1,030.0	770.0	25.0	(12)	1,760.0	(12)	(4)	(4)	(12)	(12)
Railroad freight turn-over ¹³	Billion ton-kilometers.	620.0	510.0	80.0	30.0	(12)	850.0	(12)	(4)	(4)	(12)	(12)

¹ Includes Poland, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. Albania is not included in the figures for gross national income and military expenditures; its contribution is, of course, insignificant.

² Includes Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, France, the German Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Austrian crude-oil figures have not been included here because production is located entirely in the Soviet zone.

³ The figures for gross national income represent domestic availabilities, or gross national product plus or minus net foreign investment.

⁴ Not included.

⁵ Estimates for the countries of the Soviet bloc are based on pre-Korean budget information, which is the latest available. They are not strictly comparable to figures for the West because the latter reflect changes which resulted from the outbreak of the Korean war. The comparable figure for the United States, for example, would be \$14,500,000,000. In general, these estimates include direct military expenditures plus expenditures for paramilitary troops, atomic energy research, and stockpiling. Western data also include MDAP expenditures. Figures for the United Kingdom and Canada represent expenditures on the defense department only because of the lack of more complete information.

⁶ This figure includes an estimated 10,000,000 workers in forced labor camps, who are mainly engaged in construction and other nonagricultural activities. Comparable figures for the satellite countries are not available.

⁷ Represents production of crude oil and synthetic oil measured in crude energy equivalents.

⁸ Negligible.

⁹ Includes all Western Hemisphere countries with the exception of Argentina (in addition to the United States and Canada, which are given separately).

¹⁰ Includes Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and Qatar.

¹¹ Expression of machine-tool production and inventories in units is a very rough measure of relative capability of different countries in this field because of the wide disparity in size and productivity of different machine tools.

¹² Not available.

¹³ Measurement of freight service by railroad freight turn-over is incomplete for international comparisons because a much larger proportion is hauled by this means in the U. S. S. R. and satellites than in the West. Trucking is mainly an auxiliary service in the East whereas in the United States it is a major competitor in long hauls.

8. DEFENSIVE EFFORTS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY COUNTRIES

A number of witnesses before the joint committee contended that our European partners were not bearing their fair share of the load and that until they were making greater effort no additional United States ground troops should be sent to Europe. One witness took the position that not another American dollar or another American soldier should be sent to Europe until the European states had demonstrated a greater determination to defend themselves.

In providing an adequate defense as rapidly as possible, it must be borne in mind, as one of the witnesses before the committee stated, that—

if each of the North Atlantic nations should wait to appraise its partners' efforts before determining its own, the result would be disastrous * * *.

The situation is such that we are all required to move together if we are jointly to defend ourselves. We expect our partners in the North Atlantic Pact to do as much as they can, just as they expect us to do all we can. No state can do the job alone. General Eisenhower observed that—

the United States can [not] pick up the world on its economic, financial, and material shoulders and carry it. We must have cooperation if we are going to work with other nations.

The evidence shows that the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty are putting their shoulder to the wheel. Britain has indicated that by the end of this year she expects to have 22 divisions in being or capable of rapid mobilization. This will be approximately equal to our own plans, which call for a total force the equivalent of 24 divisions. Two of the new British divisions will be sent to augment the two now stationed in Western Germany. It will be recalled that the British population is about 50,000,000 as compared with our 150,000,000. France with a population of about 42,000,000 has announced that in addition to 5 divisions she now has in being, she will expand to a total of 20 divisions over the next 3 years.

Our Western European partners have made substantial increases in their military expenditures during the past year. The table which follows shows that during 1949 the United States was putting 5 percent of its gross national product into military expenditures, and that during the same year France and the United Kingdom were putting more than that percentage into their military expenditures. Expenditures for military purposes just prior to Korea show that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France were putting a larger percentage of their gross national product into military expenditures than was the United States.

Expenditures in the United States after Korea jumped from 5.5 percent of the gross national product to 15.7 percent, a threefold percentage increase. Estimates for our partners indicate that a number of them expect to double their percentages during the forthcoming year.

Financial effort of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries

Country	Fiscal year beginning 1949			Fiscal year beginning 1950 (pre-Korea rate)			Fiscal year beginning 1951		
	Gross national product ¹	Military expenditures ²	Gross national product	Gross national product	Military expenditures ²	Gross national product	Gross national product	Military expenditures ³	Gross national product
	<i>Mil-lions</i>	<i>Mil-lions</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Mil-lions</i>	<i>Mil-lions</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Mil-lions</i>	<i>Mil-lions</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Belgium-Luxemburg	\$6,050	\$152	2.5	\$6,345	\$187	2.9	\$6,582	\$289	4.4
Denmark	2,918	44	1.5	2,981	51	1.7	3,020	85	2.8
France	23,921	1,390	5.8	24,639	1,686	6.8	25,378	2,450	9.7
Italy	13,000	474	3.6	13,500	600	4.4	14,450	915	6.3
Netherlands	4,883	221	4.5	5,042	303	6.0	5,209	392	6.5
Norway	1,669	50	3.0	1,747	42	2.4	1,810	91	5.4
Portugal	1,781	52	2.9	1,855	56	3.0	1,935	57	2.9
United Kingdom	37,030	2,120	5.7	39,030	2,374	6.1	40,335	3,640	9.0
Total	91,252	4,503	4.9	95,139	5,299	5.6	98,717	7,919	8.0
Canada	16,025	349	2.2	17,500	493	2.8	19,000	1,520	8.0
United States	6 260,000	13,132	5.0	6 275,000	15,124	5.5	6 308,000	48,473	15.7

¹ In general terms, the total amount that is spent by a country for all things put together.

² Generally include defense expenditures not found in Defense Department budgets.

³ Programs in various stages of formation. Generally, Government plans not yet voted on. In some cases based upon press and other nonofficial reports.

⁴ Military production estimated as \$1,250,000,000.

⁵ Military production estimated as \$2,500,000,000.

⁶ Unofficial estimates.

In using these figures it must be remembered that they give only a rough approximation of the efforts of each country. Thus, the several countries lump different types of expenditures under the heading of military expenditures. Furthermore, ERP funds whose source is in the United States, may be used in some industries that would be involved indirectly in increased military production.

9. WHY SEND UNITED STATES TROOPS TO EUROPE

It is proposed to send additional American ground troops to Western Europe because the security of the United States will best be assured by keeping the threat of Communist aggression as far away from our shores as possible and because, in the words of General Marshall—

the United States will be safer * * * if governments friendly to the United States are in power throughout the North Atlantic Community.

At this moment in history the interests of our Atlantic Treaty allies in maintaining their independence and our interest in maintaining our independence, coincide. That means that what is good for their defense, is good for our defense.

We do not propose to help in the defense of Western Europe merely because they want our help. We plan to help them because that is the best way we can help ourselves.

We are not sending additional troops to Europe because we expect war. Rather it is our hope that by assisting Europe in building up its defensive strength we will deter aggression. That is our primary aim. If the strengthening of Europe's defenses should not deter aggression and, in spite of all our efforts, another war should be precipitated, then our contributions now should help defeat aggression.

The committee received information indicating that if Western Europe should fall under Communist control the ability of the United

States to defend itself would be seriously impaired, not only because some 200,000,000 additional people would be drawn behind the iron curtain, but because the tremendous productive power and skills that have been pooled in Western Europe would be lost.

General Bradley listed his reasons for sending additional American ground troops to Europe as these: (1) If war should come, the ability of our present two divisions in Germany to defend themselves would be "immeasurably" increased; (2) the will of the free nations to fight, their morale, will be given reassurance by our sending of additional troops; (3) we need strength in Europe to deter the Soviet from attack as "weakness can only invite attack"; (4) "this is not the time for suspicious scrutiny"—it is the time "for generous leadership"; and (5) if war comes, we should choose to fight in other parts of the world than the United States.

10. NUMBER OF UNITED STATES TROOPS INVOLVED

Because of the uncertainty throughout the country as to the number of United States troops which were to be sent to Europe to implement article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the administration reluctantly decided to make known the exact number. General Marshall's testimony before the committee states the considerations clearly:

* * * I have obtained the express permission of the President to discuss with you the specific strength of the ground forces which the United States has planned to maintain in Europe in the present emergency.

I take this step reluctantly because of the security considerations involved, but I have reached the conclusion that there is a greater peril to our security through weakening the morale of our allies by a debate based upon uncertainties than there can possibly be through the public disclosure of our planned strength figures.

* * * Our plans, based on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, * * * contemplate sending four additional divisions to Europe.

There are at present in Europe on occupation duty approximately the equivalent of two United States Army combat divisions located in Germany, Austria, and Trieste. There are in addition ground troops stationed in neighboring areas and other establishments to garrison airfields in the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Near East. The figures here given do not include the United States naval and air forces in Europe. The two divisions on occupation are ground troops only, as are the four divisions referred to by General Marshall.

General Eisenhower pointed out in his testimony before the joint committee that the United States forces will constitute only a minor portion of Western Europe's land army and that the Western European nations will furnish the major portion of the integrated forces to be under his command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a careful review of the program, have recommended and the President has approved the sending of the four additional divisions to Europe to become part of the integrated forces. It is estimated that these four additional divisions, plus the required additional supporting troops, will increase the number of United States troops in Europe by about 100,000.

There will thus be stationed in Europe, in all, six United States divisions of ground troops. While no one can predict what the future will bring, General Marshall assured the committee that unless the world situation grows worse it is not anticipated that any more ground troops for Europe will be required from the United States.

11. FEASIBILITY OF RATIO OR NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES TROOP CONTRIBUTION

The committee considered the feasibility of establishing a mathematical formula or numerical ratio as the basis on which the United States might supply ground troops for European defense to be matched by contributions of the other North Atlantic Treaty countries. It was not considered advisable to incorporate any such formula or ratio in the resolution reported.

General Eisenhower, General Marshall, Secretary Acheson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their testimony that any hard-and-fast ratio for the supplying of troops by the 12 member nations would greatly complicate the many problems involved in the joint defense of the North Atlantic Community and would not in the end contribute to the successful defense of the free world. Furthermore, there are some distinct disadvantages to any formula or numerical ratio. Changing circumstances may make any ratio once adopted unrealistic in the future. A formula or ratio adopted now might not reflect the real capacity of a member state to contribute troops to the integrated force, and it would be difficult to alter ratios once established. Moreover, any change in the ratio might lead not only to serious disputes among the treaty partners but might also give rise to misleading propaganda.

Clearly, any effort to reduce the United States contribution in terms of the growing capabilities of the European partners would be difficult if this country had agreed to a specific quota or ratio.

12. COST TO THE UNITED STATES

The creation of the new Western European Army will not increase the size of the United States Military Establishment even though we contribute four divisions of ground troops. Thus, even if we did not send a single additional soldier to Europe, the proposed increase of our military forces to 3,462,000 by July 1951 would be necessary in the opinion of our military leaders.

The additional costs involved in sending the four divisions plus supporting troops to Western Europe will be the difference between maintaining these troops in this country and the cost of transporting and maintaining them in Europe. The Department of the Army has furnished the committee with the following table, indicating the additional cost of maintaining the troops in Europe to be approximately \$258 million for the first year and thereafter \$111 million, annually, on a recurring basis.

Estimate of additional costs of maintaining additional 4 divisions and supporting troops in Europe over costs of maintaining them in the United States

1. Additional annual recurring costs:	Millions
(a) Military personnel costs.....	\$47.8
Includes overseas pay differential and travel costs of individuals due to permanent change of station (assumed as 18 months). No costs are included for moving dependents.	
(b) Maintenance and operation costs.....	63.5
Increased costs of transportation of dry cargo and petroleum products; additional packing and crating costs; increased communication costs; decreased cost of repairs and utilities costs in Europe.	
Total, annual recurring costs.....	111.3
2. Nonrecurring costs (additional):	
(a) Military personnel costs.....	18.1
Permanent change of station travel costs for deployment of 4 divisions and supporting troops to Europe.	
(b) Maintenance and operation costs.....	128.4
Transportation of individual and organizational supplies and equipment, including port costs, packing and crating, etc.	
Total, nonrecurring costs.....	146.5

NOTE.—The above approximations are based on full "pay as you go" in United States dollars in all countries of Europe, since it is assumed that this is a long-term projection. To the extent that England, France, Germany, Italy, or other countries contribute to, or furnish, the services and facilities required in accordance with agreements which might exist under the mutual defense assistance concept of the North Atlantic Pact, the estimates of additional costs may be reduced.

13. WHY AIR AND NAVAL FORCES ARE NOT ENOUGH

The argument has been advanced that the United States should concentrate on its sea and air forces because with a strong strategic air force an aggressor could be effectively stopped; and with a strong navy the sea lanes could be kept open to supply our allies and our bases abroad.

The experience of the United States in World War II proved conclusively that even on the small Pacific islands, where we had overwhelming superiority and were able to saturate the defenders with bombardment from air and sea, this was not enough to conquer the islands. In spite of the heaviest of bombardments, assault troops had desperate fighting to do before the enemy could be overcome. Some advocates of air power, who appeared before the committee, asserted that a strong air force could meet and effectively smash any ground attack. But leading officers of the Air Force, such as General Vandenberg and General LeMay, approved the administration's plan to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Europe.

Testimony showed that even if the strategic Air Force of the United States were able to smash the production centers, the oil wells and refineries, the transportation system, and the whole economic structure of a potential aggressor, nevertheless such bombardment would take time. Before the bombardment had been completed the aggressor could roll to the coastal areas of Europe and be in complete possession of the continent. Today, Soviet Russia, it was asserted, has enough equipment and matériel in dumps scattered close to Western Europe to enable her to carry out a conquest of the continent without the necessity of resorting to her production resources behind the lines.

Ground troops are essential to stopping aggression. If there is any question on the subject, our experience in Korea should demonstrate conclusively that air superiority is not enough. There we have had complete mastery of the air, yet in spite of that the enemy has been able at times to press his advance to a perilous point.

It is thus clear that, if Western Europe is to be strong enough to preserve peace or stop aggression, if it should occur, Europe must have an effective ground force in being. The United States concentration on air and seapower alone at this stage is not enough to assure the North Atlantic Treaty Community against aggression nor to achieve the security of this country.

14. THE TIME ELEMENT

The question has frequently been asked, Why, if Western Europe is now so weak defensively, the Soviet Union does not now overrun Western Europe? A number of the witnesses before the committee indicated their belief that a Soviet attack on Western Europe has been deterred by two main considerations: first, the threat of retaliation against the Soviet by the possible use of the A-bomb; and, second, the productive capacity of the United States.

Now that the Soviet Union has the bomb it will presumably be only a matter of time until her supply will be great enough to deliver a surprise, knock-out punch to the West—including the United States as a possible high priority target—thereby seriously threatening the present productive superiority of the West. If by that time the free forces of Western Europe are not strong enough to defend against a land invasion, Soviet domination of Western Europe would easily be possible.

By commencing the defensive rearmament of Western Europe now it is hoped that sufficient strength will have been built by the time the Soviet has a substantial stock of A-bombs so that, if the deterrent of American superiority in atomic bombs is endangered, forces in being will be great enough to make a Soviet attack on the west unlikely.

General Bradley testified on this matter, in answer to a question from Senator Wiley, as follows:

* * * At the present time our greatest deterrent is the possession of the A-bomb and the capability of delivering it. As time goes on, if we can build up the complete defense of Europe to a point where it would not be easy to overrun it there would be very grave doubt as to whether or not they [the Soviet Union] could [overrun Europe]; in my opinion, when you reach that stage the chance of war is reduced very, very materially.

15. THE MORALE ELEMENT

General Eisenhower in his report to the informal joint session of the Congress pointed out that—

military strength is made up of various things, of which the fighting forces are merely the cutting edge. One of the greatest factors of this whole thing is morale * * * because morale involves understanding, it involves heart, it involves courage, fortitude, basic purpose.

Western Europe has been twice invaded and occupied in our time. Unless free Europeans see some chance of avoiding a third occupation should war come again, it will be hard for them to do their full share in developing an adequate defense. And there is also the pos-

sibility that once occupied by Communist forces, the Western European people would lose their free way of life in spite of subsequent liberation. The mere promise to be liberated is not enough to give a people morale.

The ERP restored European confidence in matters economic. Now Europe is living under the threat of actual invasion and needs another kind of hope and confidence in order to defend itself. Once these countries have built up their strength, recovered the morale they once possessed, and captured the confidence they require, their fears will be largely dissipated. Communist propaganda has said that we are weak and that our support is uncertain. General Eisenhower's trip was a restorative for Western Europe and gave the lie to Soviet propaganda. But more is needed.

General Bradley testified as to the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:

It is our opinion that additional United States forces should be committed to the defense of Europe at the earliest practicable date so that there will be no chance for doubt of American interest in the defense rather than the liberation of Europe. This should increase the will of our allies to resist. United States forces in Europe should include sufficient tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces, and the forces should be in place and ready for combat as expeditiously as possible. We are in favor of increasing our ground strength to approximately six divisions, and our tactical Air Force accordingly.

16. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

One of the most perplexing problems that the joint committee faced related to the constitutional authority of the President to send American ground forces abroad in time of peace to serve as part of an integrated defense force. While the Constitution states that the President "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" (art. II, sec. 2, clause 1), this broad grant of power is not defined. On the other hand, the Constitution gives Congress authority which, in a number of respects, bears upon the President's power. Thus, Congress has power to make rules "for the government and regulation of land and naval forces" (Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, clause 14); to declare war (*ibid.*, clause 11); to provide and maintain a Navy (*ibid.*, clause 13); to raise and support armies (*ibid.*, clause 12); and last, but not least, "to lay and collect taxes" to "provide for the common defense" (*ibid.*, clause 1).

Some witnesses before the committee took the position that the President would be usurping a congressional function in sending American troops abroad in time of peace to serve as part of what was described as an "international army." Others maintained that if the President has authority to send American troops abroad in time of war or for the protection of American lives and property, he also has the duty in time of peace to organize our defenses in the most effective way to assure victory if the security of the United States should be endangered by an attack anywhere; this includes authority for the President to put American troops into an integrated defense force if advisable.

No question was raised as to the authority of the President to send American troops to enemy territory to serve as part of an occupation army, which of course is the situation with respect to Germany, Aus-

tria, and Japan, with whom formal peace treaties have not yet been concluded.

With the exact line of authority between the President and the Congress in doubt for the past 160 years, the committee did not endeavor to resolve this issue definitively at this time. Attention is invited, however, to two documents which may be of help in analyzing the matter: one, prepared by the executive departments, sets forth the position of the Executive (Powers of the President to Send the Armed Forces Outside the United States, prepared for the use of the joint committee made up of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, February 28, 1951), and the other, a collection of opinions on the subject prepared by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, February 15, 1951).

It should be noted in this connection that paragraph 1 of the operative parts of the pending resolution does approve the—

action of the President * * * in cooperating in the common defense effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating * * * General * * * Eisenhower as supreme allied commander, and in placing the armed forces of the United States, Europe, under his command.

Thus, by approving the placing of United States armed forces in Europe under the command of General Eisenhower the Senate is endorsing their service in the international integrated defense force of which General Eisenhower is supreme commander.

Paragraph 2 expresses the belief it is—

necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic areas.

By this paragraph the belief is expressed that our fair share of the troops necessary should be contributed for joint defense—the joint defense being that which General Eisenhower will organize as Supreme Commander.

In considering the power of the President to send American armed forces abroad, the committee was aware that his constitutional authority to use our armed forces abroad would be the same whether applied to ground, air, or naval forces. It also understood that General Eisenhower will command all units—land, air, or sea—within his jurisdiction. The committee was primarily concerned, however, with the policy with respect to the assignment of American ground forces to Europe because of the numbers of men involved and the concern on the part of some individuals that sending additional ground troops now might be but a first step in sending larger contingents to Europe.

17. THE PLACE OF GREECE, TURKEY, SPAIN, YUGOSLAVIA

In developing the capabilities of Western Europe to resist Communist aggression, the committee believes that, insofar as possible, full use of all available assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be sought. To this end Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey are important. Turkey has a national will to resist aggression and a very effective ground army. The Turkish contingent in Korea has distinguished itself for its fighting ability. The Greek Army has

been engaged in war and has demonstrated its combat worthiness. The Yugoslav Army, while lacking modern equipment, is substantial and would add considerable strength to the military forces of Western Europe. While the present fighting qualities of the Spanish Army are not known, it would constitute a potential resource and the geographic location of Spain would be most helpful. Spain has 350,000 men under arms; Yugoslavia, 330,000; and Greece, 150,000. Reliable estimates are not available as to the present size of the Turkish Army.

It is, however, fair to say that the addition of over a million armed men, who would fight for their freedom, would contribute immeasurably to the security of Western Europe and be an additional deterrent to Soviet aggression. Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey would lie on the flanks of any Soviet attack to the west. Almost without exception the witnesses agreed that it would be desirable to include the forces of the four states in the forces available to oppose Communist aggression.

18. THE PLACE OF WESTERN GERMANY IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

The committee examined the part Germany should play in the collective defense of Western Europe, in view of the wartime agreements and the surrender act requiring that Germany be disarmed and demilitarized. But security conditions in the world, and especially in Western Europe, have changed drastically since 1945. The Allied control machinery has broken down because of Soviet obstructionism; Germany has been divided into two parts for the same reason and the eastern half possesses a large, heavily armed police force capable of military action. As a result grave doubts have arisen lest an attack from East Germany be engineered against West Germany on the same order as that which occurred in Korea in June 1950.

In the face of these developments sentiment toward German rearming has changed in many quarters. At their New York meeting on September 19, 1950, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom agreed to consider an attack on Western Germany as an attack against their countries, and shortly thereafter the United States proposed that Germany be permitted to participate in the defense plans of Western Europe by contributing military forces. At its meeting on September 26, 1950, the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced that "Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defense of Western Europe." At its Brussels meeting in December the NATO Council reached unanimous agreement on Germany's part in the defense plans; and, on January 9, 1951, negotiations with the new Federal Republic of Germany were initiated in order to implement the Brussels decision. As was to be expected, the Soviet Union objected and has carried on vicious propaganda against German participation.

It is clear that the German people are not unanimous in the desire to rearm their country. Opposition has been voiced, especially by the Socialist Party. Nevertheless, German public opinion seems to favor (1) German contribution to the European defense, (2) participation in European defense only if there is a reasonable chance existing that it can stop aggression; and (3) participation in European defense on the basis of equality. The joint committee, fully cognizant of the importance of German participation in the defense of Western Europe,

urges the executive branch to press forward with negotiations leading to such participation.

19. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The primary body of the NATO is the Council provided for in article 9 of the treaty. This body is composed of representatives of governments, and usually the foreign minister of each nation represents his country in the Council. The Council meets whenever special problems require its attention. It has established on a permanent basis a Council of Deputies, which acts for it and which is located in London. The United States representative and Chairman is Ambassador Charles M. Spofford.

Also, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, there is a Defense Committee, composed of Defense Ministers. General Marshall is the United States representative. Like the Council, the Defense Committee meets irregularly. It has a subordinate Military Committee, which is composed of Chiefs of Staff of the various nations. This body likewise does not meet regularly. Its executive agent is the Standing Group, which is composed of the Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives, of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. This group is permanently located in Washington.


General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe is subordinate to the Standing Group. He is also commander in chief of the United States forces in Europe, subject to the limitations noted in the analysis of paragraph 1 of the resolution. In the latter capacity he, of course, receives his instructions through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The international instructions which he receives from the Standing Group are based upon the combined views of the members of the Standing Group. The United States member of the Standing Group receives his guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On the civilian side of the NATO there are two additional committees, the first of which is the Defense Production Board. The United States member is Mr. William Batt. This Board has appointed, as Coordinator of North Atlantic Production, Mr. William R. Herod, who will have about him an integrated international staff. The primary job of this group is to obtain a balanced and coordinated and sufficient program of production for defense in Europe.

The second committee of the civilian organization is the Defense Finance and Economic Committee, which is composed in most instances of finance ministers. The United States representative is Ambassador Milton Katz. This body does not meet regularly but has a permanent working staff situated in London. It is anticipated that in the near future this Committee will be reorganized along the lines of the Defense Production Board so that an integrated international staff can tackle the problems of adequate financial and economic arrangements to permit the attainment of the required military strength in Europe.

The Department of State has primary responsibility for originating instructions to the United States member of the Defense Finance and Economic Committee.

In order to be sure that the instructions going to United States representatives in the NATO and each of its components represent



coordinated United States Government positions, there has been created a Committee on International Security Affairs, chaired by Mr. Thomas D. Cabot, Director of International Security Affairs in the Department of State. Its members include representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Harriman. This Committee is designed to coordinate and guide the various United States Government agencies in order that a consistent application of the United States policy both in the NATO and through the various United States diplomatic, economic, and military missions in Europe may be achieved.

The organization of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) is related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. MDAP makes provision for the supplying of arms and equipment to those states with which our security is bound. It is broader than aid for the North Atlantic Treaty countries; but the major part of its funds are distributed to NATO partners. It takes the form of reimbursable aid and of grants-in-aid. The Organization of MDAP is centered in the State Department under the Director of International Security Affairs mentioned above. A regional office in London, under the direction of Mr. Spofford, coordinates the field activities and also the work of United States military representatives in each embassy located in a country where mutual defense assistance is being given.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may be seen at a glance by consulting the chart on the opposite page.

PART IV. CONCLUSIONS

20. THE COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

The joint committee believes that the national security of the United States requires the sending of four additional divisions of United States ground troops to Western Europe to serve as part of the integrated defensive force in the North Atlantic community. In thus developing the collective strength of the North Atlantic area, the aim of the treaty partners is threefold: (1) to prevent the outbreak of war by building deterrent power in Western Europe; (2) to make sure that the Soviet Union will not accomplish its purposes by means of indirect aggression; and (3) to make certain that the free nations are strong enough to defend themselves if war is thrust upon them.

The committee desires to emphasize again that the primary purpose in approving the transfer of additional American forces to Western Europe is to seek to maintain peace by building up defensive strength, rather than by inviting attack because of existing weakness. The committee reiterates the fact that the American people want peace, but they will not permit their freedom to be destroyed by overwhelming military force controlled by the Kremlin.

